By Metehan Tekinırk
Europe is at a pivotal moment. With war in the east and the Trump administration reinstalled in Washington, stronger than before and seemingly intent on making Europe pay for its own defense,[1] questions surrounding the future of the transatlantic relationship and European defense are even more pressing. In the own words of the president of the European Commission and former minister of defense of Germany, Ursula von der Leyen, it suddenly seems that “the security architecture that [Europe] relied on can no longer be taken for granted.” But “Europe is ready to step up,” von der Leyen reassured after proposing a new European defense plan of over €800 billion.[2] This critical moment, however, is fraught with multiple difficult political challenges and risks. It is also part of a much broader process concerning the status of the international order that came to being after the end of the Second World War.
One obvious question is how the proposed plan will be financed and how this will affect the economic stability and circumstances of European Union (EU) member states and their domestic politics. With the painful memory of belt-tightening measures in the wake of the Great Recession and the ensuing European sovereign debt crisis still fresh and given the meager post-recession recovery of most European economies, this question carries great weight and potential implications for challenger parties throughout Europe. A second question concerns European leadership. Will a viable candidate emerge to lead Europe through this juncture and in the near future? Third, there is the question of how this challenging moment will impact the EU’s relationship with its most important and problematic special partner—Turkey. This is because European decision-makers are considering harnessing Turkey’s military capabilities and defense industry and because Turkey is a major conventional military power at the southern flank of NATO and a factor in regional conflicts—including but not limited to the war in Ukraine—as a major provider of drone technologies. How Europe manages these challenges and how these issues will play out will likely impact the EU’s stability and shape its identity going forward.
In Retrospect: The Post-World War II International Order
Europe’s pivotal moment is part of a broader process—a fundamental shift in world politics. The international order that emerged following the end of the Second World War rested on certain pillars and organizing principles. It promoted free trade and was supported by core economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the precursors to today’s World Bank (WB) and World Trade Organization (WTO). It also came to espouse security cooperation given the United States’ status as a hegemonic power and strategic interests in protecting Western Europe against Russian expansionism. “The idea of a defensive alliance between like-minded nations, within the framework of the United Nations,” first begot the European alliance known as the Western Union in 1948, an early “association of democratic and peace-loving states.”[3] Later, as the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington in 1949, this multilateral approach to defense was expanded and reaffirmed, with the treaty also stressing its signatories’ commitment to safeguarding the shared “principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”[4]
When the so-called liberal or rules-based international order was emerging in the 1940s, the US was the manufacturing powerhouse of the world, with the American economy representing “nearly half the world economy in the immediate postwar period” (Nye 2015, 394). Though this peak figure declined with the ensuing post-war reconstruction in Europe (and later Japan), the preeminence of the US as an industrial power carried on. With its goods “produced so efficiently that they [were] by and large competitive even in other” advanced capitalist states, the US was naturally “the primary beneficiary of a maximally free world market” (Wallerstein 1980, 38)—the economic hegemon. This reaffirmed the US-centric nature of the system.
The situation is fundamentally different today economically and politically, no matter how one looks at it. While the US clearly retains a very significant role in global economic affairs and is still the largest economy in the world in nominal terms, its status has been diminishing for some time, at least since the Great Recession. According to estimates from the IMF, the Chinese economy alone currently amounts to almost twenty percent of global output adjusted for purchasing-power-parity (PPP),[5] ranking higher than the US in terms of PPP.[6] Over the course of the neoliberal phase of globalization, Western economies have grown largely dependent on Chinese manufacturing as industrial activity shifted to countries and regions with cheaper factors of production and less stringent environmental regulations.
Further, the economic and technological might of China and the economic potential of some countries known as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) also translate to greater political power and influence around the world, especially over developing countries. Washington-based institutions such as the IMF and WB now face powerful alternatives because of this shift in influence. “China and the BRICS promote a rival form of strategic capitalism through their growing role in existing institutions” like the IMF, WB, and WTO, and they “also promote it through a new set of institutions such as the BRICS Summits, the New Development Bank, the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), among others” (Öniş 2017, 22).
Some of the largest infrastructure and development projects in regions such as Africa and Latin America clearly reflect China’s growing role and influence in the developing world. “Chinese firms are now leading builders, bankers, owners, and operators of ports in Africa” (Kardon 2022, 10). For instance, the Lekki Deep Sea Port in Nigeria was built by the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) with financing from the China Development Bank (CDB).[7] Another example is the Chancay deep-water megaport in Peru, majority-owned by the Chinese state-owned enterprise Cosco.[8] Chancay adds to the maritime component of the Belt and Road Initiative, i.e., China’s development strategy to boost infrastructure and economic connectivity throughout Southeast Asia, Oceania, the Indian Ocean, and East Africa.[9] It can open up new trade routes bypassing North America, help China entrench its position in Latin America and the Caribbean,[10] and is projected to become one of the largest ports in the region.[11]
Given those Chinese-backed or -sponsored development and investment banks effectively rivaling the likes of the World Bank, developing or authoritarian countries have new opportunities to “escape the pressures and disciplines of Western powers or Western-dominated institutions” (Öniş 2017, 24). The erosion of US primacy and the economic basis for Western superiority and the concomitant rise of non-Western powers like China and India (Öniş 2017; Acharya 2018),[12] therefore, link to the increasingly compromised position of the West as a natural reference point and partner for developing countries.
These new realities of the global hierarchy of power relations, particularly since the Great Recession, imply nothing short of a fundamental shift in ground for the international system. The US itself, on the other hand, no longer seems to be a proponent of free trade, whether it is due to the Trump administration’s desire to use tariffs as a (re)negotiation tactic or to a genuine belief in the utility of protectionism in a changing economic climate. All in all, the new foreign policy paradigm being unveiled in Washington, based on transactionalism and the preservation and advancement of the self-interests of the US, “has effectively dismantled any notion of American leadership for a liberal international order based on liberal norms and democratic values” (Öniş 2025). What is unfolding before our eyes seems to be a dramatic self-adjustment of America’s position within the world, reflecting what Öniş (2025) calls a quest for “hegemony without leadership.” The new approach is oriented towards retaining American hegemony, but only by shedding some of the costs, engagement, and responsibilities that came with global leadership. The changing nature of defense cooperation between the US and NATO members in Europe and the juncture in the transatlantic relationship is best interpreted against this broader backdrop.
The Problem of Financing the Proposed Expenditures: The Ghost of European Austerity?
Post-Recession Europe, specifically, has been characterized by slow economic recovery, the widespread implementation of austerity measures to cope with the sovereign debt crisis—which energized anti-establishment social and protest movements and helped fuel the electoral rise of so-called “populist radical right parties”—and meager growth. It is this rather uncertain economic background against which Europe now faces the problem of having to suddenly increase defense spending by significant margins. How will the defense expenses be financed? Back in December 2024, former prime minister of the Netherlands and current NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte suggested one way eerily reminiscent of the belt-tightening measures of the post-Recession context: “spending less on other priorities” such as pensions, healthcare systems, or public provisions. Calling on public support, Rutte asked citizens of NATO countries in Europe to tell their politicians to “accept to make sacrifices today so that we can stay safe tomorrow.”[13] German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s signaling in the context of statements he made on the state of the German economy, the continent’s largest, points at a similar direction: “the welfare state that we have today can no longer be financed with what we produce in the economy.”[14] Other ideas floated around include the issuance of so-called “defense bonds” and the relaxing of EU’s (public) debt rules to allow member states to run larger budget deficits than normally allowed,[15] the reallocation of EU funds originally intended for other purposes, a €150 billion long-maturity loan instrument called “Security Action for Europe” (SAFE) to help member states invest in key defense areas,[16] the “mobilization of private capital” (including citizens’ savings) “by accelerating the Savings and Investment Union and through the European Investment Bank,” and the “use all of the financial levers at our disposal,” as von der Leyen put it.[17]
Ultimately, the proposed plan would rely on austerity or debt and would tap into the available pockets of money. The relaxation of fiscal rules on member states would theoretically provide them greater budgetary space to ramp up “their defence expenditures without triggering the excessive deficit procedure.”[18] How voters and some political entrepreneurs across Europe may react to this, though, especially considering that so-called populist parties have electorally exploited the pains of austerity in recent years, is a practical problem. As the defense minister of the Netherlands has acknowledged, all “three options in theory” (raising taxes, cutting spending, raising the debt level) will stir up “difficult political discussions.”[19] “With politicians bickering about pensions and social spending, and loth to raise taxes, the reality” may be, as explained in The Economist, that “of a continent unwilling to inconvenience itself for something so trifling as fending off a potential invader.”[20]
Some countries in Europe where people feel more acutely threatened by an aggressive Russia have already increased their spending on defense over the past decade, such as Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden, and Finland.[21] Representatives of Poland have announced that the country’s defense expenditures next year will increase to 4.7 percent of its GDP. “But others are constrained by having maxed out their national credit card: France, Italy and Spain all have debt-to-GDP ratios of over 100%, and are under pressure” to improve their public finances.[22] The idea of spending on more defense is already “causing consternation among Europe’s cash-strapped governments.”[23] Depending on the level of public support for the idea in some western and southern European contexts, this may turn out to be a divisive and contentious issue.
The Question of European Leadership Moving Forward
Who in Europe can provide leadership in this context? The question of European leadership was much less acute than today when Angela Merkel was chancellor in Germany, as virtually “no one” doubted “Germany’s political, financial, and economic leadership of the European Union” (Matthijs and Kelemen 2021). Germany after Merkel, however, is politically fragile and economically weaker, causing it to become preoccupied with domestic issues. The Christian democrat (CDU/CSU) and social democrat (SPD) coalition government formed in May is “already plagued by confusion and conflict over whether the policies they agreed on are hard commitments or budget-dependent.”[24] This coalition will have to face the daunting task of trying to fend off a rising Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) poised to shake off the status quo. The German economy has been effectively cut off, starting in 2022, from the direct import of Russian natural gas, on which the German economic machine relied. Once the economic engine of Europe, Germany has not seen significant growth in five years[25] and has in fact registered contractions in 2023 and 2024, with “very strong indications that 2025 will be the third year of recession in a row.”[26] The German military, not unlike the German population, is “all the more older and shriveled,” according to a recent report from a parliamentary commissioner, and it is also plagued by poor infrastructure in many places.[27]
France, another large regional economy and a potential leader of the EU, also faces serious political uncertainty and tensions. Marine Le Pen, leading figure in the right-wing Rassemblement National—the largest opposition party in France—has recently been found guilty of embezzling EU funds with implications on her ability to stand for public office.[28] While Le Pen personally may not have the best prospects of prevailing in her legal struggles,[29] this is the type of roadblock that movements like hers typically respond to with a playbook aiming to boost their populist appeal. Unsurprisingly, Le Pen has already argued that the “system” is targeting her to prevent her party from winning elections, framing the judicial decision as an affront to French democracy—a “democratic scandal.”[30] Looking at Italy, the third largest economy in the EU, on the other hand, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s efforts seem to be aimed at positioning herself as the leader of a certain vision, not necessarily of the entire continent. Meloni and her coalition partners, given their ideological affinities with the Trump administration, were held exempt by US Vice President JD Vance as he was berating the liberal European mainstream at the Munich Security Conference in February.[31] Meloni’s April visit to the White House signals an attempt to represent those actors in Europe who are like-minded to the administration in Washington. European politics, in short, faces important divisions and uncertainties.
The EU – Turkey Relationship: Values-Based or Transactional Partnership?
The new defense imperatives have also prompted some European political elites and decision-makers to promote a closer relationship and enhanced security cooperation with Turkey, which has the second largest army among NATO countries after the US. NATO Secretary General Rutte, for one, has backed the idea of reinforced ties with Turkey, urging European leaders to maintain good relations with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and stressing the importance of Turkey’s defense industry in European efforts to rearm as well as to support Ukraine.[32] Donald Tusk, prime minister of Poland and former president of the European Council, visited Turkey in March and voiced a similar reasoning, stating that Poland—with the third largest armed force in NATO—is ready to cooperate with Turkey “both in the field of defense and the defense industry.”[33] Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the United Kingdom, who previously spoke with Erdoğan and stressed “the importance of working with international partners to uphold European security,”[34] subsequently welcomed the Turkish foreign minister at an international summit also attended by the leaders of Ukraine, France, Germany, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Canada, Finland, Sweden, Czechia, and Romania, in addition to Rutte and the presidents of the European Commission and European Council.[35] The same month, French, British, and Turkish chiefs of general staff held a joint meeting in Paris to discuss the future of European security.[36]
Bringing Turkey into the picture makes sense given its critical geostrategic position, strong military capabilities, and rising defense industry, but risks further entrenching the transactional relationship that has emerged between the EU and the former since the so-called Syrian migrant crisis, at the expense of cooperation based on the EU’s fundamental values and principles as well as democracy in Turkey. The EU, while it may be based on the idea of (economic) cooperation and interdependence, is ultimately a project of democracy. Accordingly, “in the late 1990s and early 2000s,” the EU had “taken to portraying itself as a ‘normative’ power.” Indeed, EU leaders for long “eagerly promoted the idea that while the union lacked the attributes of a traditional military superpower, it could project global leadership by promoting norms such as democracy, rule of law, human rights, and social solidarity” (Matthijs and Kelemen 2021). Among other things, the “unsavory ‘money for refugees’ deal” it signed with Turkey in 2016, i.e., the cooperation arrangement that formulated a temporary response to the EU’s migration problem by providing financial and other backing to the increasingly autocratic government led by Erdoğan, stands out for helping make “a mockery of such lofty aspirations” (ibid.). Now facing another—and graver—crisis, the EU risks repeating the mistake of propping up an authoritarian leader at its periphery who jailed in March the pro-democracy opposition’s presidential candidate and best campaigner and continues to keep democratic opposition under siege (see Esen and Gumuscu 2025).
Will European leaders pragmatically seek good relations with an autocratic leader at their doorstep like Rutte hints they should? “Some high-ranking European officials may believe they have little incentive to confront Erdoğan” over his democratic transgressions, “expecting to rely on the Turkish army to shore up European security. They may also view their public criticism as largely ineffective anyway, often exploited by the [Erdoğan] regime for propaganda purposes” (Sinanoglu 2025). Or will they forge an alternate path of building a stronger relationship with Turkey based on fundamental values? The former option may seem more convenient. Yet the EU, considering that it still has some leverage over Turkey especially given the latter’s economic fragility (Sinanoglu 2025), may also open further channels of cooperation and integration but make these conditional on Turkey’s democratization. After all, that convenient option would jeopardize whatever credibility and soft power the EU has remaining as a bloc professing to uphold democracy. If the EU is to maintain its normative appeal and identity rooted in democracy, it must steer away from sheer transactionalism and not sacrifice the values it is founded upon.
Metehan Tekinırk is a political scientist who is currently a Visiting Assistant Professor at Colgate University. His research centers on democratic erosion and resilience, populism, and nationalism, and he has published in academic outlets such as the German Journal of Comparative Politics, Populism, and the Research Handbook on Nationalism. He received his MA and PhD degrees from Boston University and is originally from Istanbul.
References
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Esen, Berk. and Sebnem Gumuscu. 2025. “After Crackdown, Is Turkey an Autocracy?” Journal of Democracy (online exclusive). https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/after-crackdown-is-turkey-an-autocracy/
Kardon, Isaac. 2022. “China’s Ports in Africa.” In (In)Roads and Outposts: Critical Infrastructure in China’s Africa Strategy, edited by Nadège Rolland. NBR Special Report #98. The National Bureau of Asian Research.
Matthijs, M. and R. Daniel Kelemen. 2021. “The Other Side of Angela Merkel.” Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/09/angela-merkel-german-chancellor-europe-trade-euro-refugees-crisis/.
Nye, Joseph. S. 2015. “Is the American Century Over?” Political Science Quarterly, 130 (3): pp. 393–400. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43828688
Öniş, Ziya. 2017. “The Age of Anxiety: The Crisis of Liberal Democracy in a Post-Hegemonic Global Order.” The International Spectator, 52 (3): pp. 18–35.
——— 2025. “The Second Trump Era: The Quest for American Hegemony without Leadership. Global Panorama. https://www.globalpanorama.org/en/2025/03/the-second-trump-era-the-quest-for-american-hegemony-without-leadership-ziya-onis/
Sinanoglu, Semuhi. 2025. “Standing up for Istanbul’s mayor will strengthen European security.” Global Policy. https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/27/03/2025/standing-istanbuls-mayor-will-strengthen-european-security
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[1] “Rubio: US is committed to NATO, but Europe must spend more on defence.” Reuters, 3 April 2025 https://www.reuters.com/world/us-has-no-plans-sudden-withdrawal-europe-natos-rutte-says-2025-04-03/ <accessed on 5 April 2025.>
[2] European Commission, 18 March 2025 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_793 <accessed on 6 April 2025.>
[3] Ismay, L. (1954) NATO: The First Five Years, 1949 – 1954. Bosch-Utrecht: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Retrieved from the NATO Archives on 10 April 2025, https://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/1.htm.
[4] U.S. Department of State & Bevans, C. I. (1946) Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America: Volume 4 Multilateral treaties, -1949. United States: Library of Congress. [Pdf] Retrieved from the Library of Congress on 11 April 2025, https://www.loc.gov/item/lltreaties-ustbv004/.
[5] Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/270439/chinas-share-of-global-gross-domestic-product-gdp/.
[6] Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/270267/united-states-share-of-global-gross-domestic-product-gdp/
[7] Nantulya, P. (2025) “Mapping China’s Strategic Port Development in Africa.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-port-development-africa/#:~:text=This%20is%20the%20case%20in,on%20a%2016%2Dyear%20lease <accessed on 10 April 2025.>
[8] “Chinese-backed port project in Peru to be the ‘gateway from South America to Asia,’ official says.” Associated Press. 22 August 2023. https://apnews.com/article/peru-chancay-china-port-construction-d13e8e8fe19289a6ab97628f708bc671 <accessed on 10 April 2025.>
[9] “China’s Maritime Silk Road: Strategic and Economic Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region.”
Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2 April 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-maritime-silk-road-strategic-and-economic-implications-indo-pacific-region <accessed on 10 April 2025.>
[10] “Megaport opens up Latin America to Chinese trade as US looks on.” BBC. 15 November 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg79y3rz1eo <accessed on 10 April 2025.>
[11] “China-owned Chancay Port Set to Become Latin America’s Third Largest.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. 25 February 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-owned-chancay-port-set-become-latin-americas-third-largest <accessed on 10 April 2025.>
[12] Also see, “U.S. Role in Global Economy Declines Nearly 50%.” Forbes. 29 February 2016. https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2016/02/29/u-s-role-in-global-economy-declines-nearly-50/ <accessed on 10 April 2025.>
[13] “NATO chief asks European citizens to ‘make sacrifices’ to boost defence spending.” Euronews. 12 December 2024. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/12/12/nato-chief-asks-european-citizens-to-make-sacrifices-to-boost-defence-spending <accessed on 12 April 2025.>
[14] “German welfare state ‘can no longer be financed’—Merz.” Deutsche Welle. 23 August 2025. https://www.dw.com/en/german-welfare-state-can-no-longer-be-financed-merz/a-73742270 <accessed on 13 September 2025.>
[15] “Europe considers a major defense spending package as Trump signals disengagement.” NPR. 4 March 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/03/04/nx-s1-5317453/europe-defense-trump-ukraine-russia <accessed on 12 April 2025.>
[16] Acting on defence to protect Europeans. European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/topics/defence/future-european-defence_en <accessed on 21 April 2025.>
[17] European Commission. 3 March 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/sv/statement_25_673 <accessed on 12 April 2025.>
[18] “EU’s von der Leyen proposes €800 billion defense plan.” Deutsche Welle. 4 March 2025. https://www.dw.com/en/eus-von-der-leyen-proposes-800-billion-defense-plan/a-71819582 <accessed on 12 April 2025.>
[19] “Dutch government faces ‘difficult’ defence spending talks, minister says.” Euronews. 15 April 2025. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/04/15/dutch-government-faces-difficult-defence-spending-talks-minister-says <accessed on 13 April 2025.>
[20] “Europeans are hoping they can buy more guns but keep their butter.” The Economist. 12 December 2024. https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/12/12/europeans-are-hoping-they-can-buy-more-guns-but-keep-their-butter <accessed on 12 April 2025.>
[21] “NATO chief asks citizens to ‘make sacrifices’.” Euronews.
[22] The Economist. Op. cit.
[23] “Europe splits on Trump’s call to dramatically boost defense spending.” Politico. 8 January 2025. https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-tells-allies-spend-5-percent-gdp-defense-nato/ <accessed on 13 April 2025.>
[24] “Germany’s new coalition partners are already disagreeing — over what they just agreed.” Politico. 15 April 2025. https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-next-government-coalition-disagree-cdu-spd-friedrich-merz/ <accessed on 17 April 2025.>
[25] “Germany’s economy is in the dumps. Here are 5 reasons why.” Associated Press. 17 February 2025. https://apnews.com/article/germany-election-economy-china-russia-cbc88159e3ccb706c8ca268375931fda <accessed on 17 April 2025.>
[26] “German economy contracts for second consecutive year in 2024.” Reuters. 15 January 2025. https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/german-economy-contracted-02-2024-2025-01-15/ <accessed on 17 April 2025.>
[27] Unterrichtung durch die Wehrbeauftragte. Jahresbericht 2023 (65. Bericht). Drucksache 20/10500. Deutscher Bundestag. 12 March 2023. Retrieved from https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/wehrbeauftragter/jahresberichte on 19 April 2025.
[28] “France’s Le Pen convicted of graft, barred from running for president in 2027.” Reuters. 31 March 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/frances-le-pen-faces-crunch-day-graft-trial-that-could-kill-her-presidential-2025-03-31/ <accessed on 20 April 2025.>
[29] “Le Pen is down but not out.” Politico. 15 April 2025. https://www.politico.eu/article/france-marine-le-pen-down-not-out-election/ <accessed on 20 April 2025.>
[30] “Here’s a look at the election ban on France’s far-right Le Pen and the legal issues.” Associated Press. 1 April 2025. https://apnews.com/article/france-marine-le-pen-verdict-presidential-election-348a9dad6f207c77eaa80c6ace78d516 <accessed on 20 April 2025.>
[31] “How Giorgia Meloni Became Europe’s ‘Trump Whisperer’.” Time. 16 April 2025. https://time.com/7278270/meloni-white-house-visit-trump-whisperer/ <accessed on 21 April 2025.>
[32] “NATO chief calls on EU to work more closely with Turkey.” 11 March 2025. The Brussels Times. https://www.brusselstimes.com/1481346/nato-chief-calls-on-eu-to-work-more-closely-with-turkey <accessed on 20 April 2025.>
[33] “Poland’s Tusk wants Turkey to take a leading role in ending Ukraine war.” Politico. 12 March 2025. https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-donald-tusk-turkey-ending-war-ukraine-russia-europe/ <accessed on 20 April 2025.>
[34] PM call with President Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: 28 February 2025. Government of the United Kingdom. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-call-with-president-turkiye-recep-tayyip-erdogan-28-february-2025 <accessed on 20 April 2025.>
[35] Prime Minister Keir Starmer to host leaders summit on Ukraine. 2 March 2025. Government of the United Kingdom. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-keir-starmer-to-host-leaders-summit-on-ukraine <accessed on 20 April 2025.>
[36] “French, British, Turkish military chiefs discuss European security.” Anadolu Agency. 13 March 2025. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/french-british-turkish-military-chiefs-discuss-european-security/3508807 <accessed on 20 April 2025.>
