By Sarah Wolff
What drives the EU’s migration and asylum policy? Once intended to harmonize standards across EU member states and guarantee that all migrants and asylum seekers in the EU enjoy similar rights, this policy has evolved significantly. Current developments are signaling a turn towards illiberal migration practices, the undermining of the global refugee regime, and a geopoliticization of asylum. These trends have been reinforced since the 2015 so-called “refugee crisis” and since the rise of the far-right, which has been marked in the past few years by the first anti-immigrants demonstrations in Poland, Portugal, and The Netherlands.
The past decade has also been marked by an over-politicization of migration, with a conflation of terms such as migrant, asylum seeker, and refugee. For the purpose of this article it is important to recall that, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), an international migrant is someone who “cross(es) State boundaries to live in another country for a minimum length of time” (IOM website). The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs defines a long-term migrant as a person who lives outside his or her country of origin for at least twelve months.[1] Refugees, according to article 1(a) of the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, have “fled their country due to a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, and [are] unable or unwilling to return.” An asylum seeker is someone who seeks international protection in another country due to fear of persecution.
Altogether, in the EU in 2025, according to the European Asylum Agency, there were 1.2 million pending asylum cases (including at the appeal or review stage) by the end of October. Out of those, 4.5 million Ukrainians benefit from a temporary protection directive that provides them with a group protection. Venezuelans constitute the largest group currently seeking asylum in the EU+, which includes the EU, Switzerland, and Norway. In comparison, at the global level, according to UNHCR,[2] there are currently 42.5 million refugees, 67.8 million people displaced within the borders of their own countries (internally displaced people), and 8.42 million asylum seekers, mostly hosted by countries in the Global South such as Turkey, Colombia, and Uganda.
It is within this context that over the past decade the EU has mostly focused on irregular migration and asylum, therefore weakening the principle of non-refoulement as a basis for the right to asylum. In the past two years, the EU has engaged in transactional migration deals with third countries such as Tunisia, Senegal, Lebanon, Egypt, or Mauritania, where the protection of human rights remains uncertain. Moreover, the 2024 New Pact on Migration, which should be implemented by EU member states by the summer of 2026, relies on a fragile institutional consensus. In a context where the US administration has deported 230,000 people over the past year, one may ask whether the EU is moving towards a model of migration governance increasingly shaped by deterrence, externalization, and geopolitical bargaining rather than the protection of fundamental rights. To provide a response to this interrogation, I review here the current state of the legislation, assess the EU’s transactional migration diplomacy, and focus on two legislative developments that have led to the acceleration of the return of asylum seekers and irregular migrants and the downgrading of the duties the EU holds in the field of rescue at sea. I conclude that the lack of reflection in developing a genuine EU labor migration policy has been one of the main weaknesses of its migration policy.
A Contested (New) Pact on Migration
Over the last decade, member states have diverged in their approach to the concept of solidarity and “burden-sharing,” which has stalled reforms in the Common European Asylum System since 2013. Nonetheless, after four years of negotiations, the new Pact on Migration was eventually adopted shortly before the 2024 European elections and framed as a victory by European policy-makers. Presented as an antidote to the rise of the far-right, its adoption has however not stopped the progress of the anti-immigration far-right at the European Parliament, as demonstrated by the increase in the number of seats won by far-right representatives from 18 percent of the chamber in 2019 to 26 percent in the 2024 elections.[3] In addition, the implementation of the new pact has been highly contested, with fifteen member states immediately asking for a more repressive approach in a letter addressed to the President of the European Commission.[4] Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk also announced in February 2025[5] that he would not implement the pact, as it does not provide enough security guarantees at the Polish border. Therefore, the pact’s implementation in national law is uncertain to take place by June 2026, and the pact could remain a dead letter.
Overall, the EU Pact on Migration mostly focuses on asylum and signals a hardening of migration policies in Europe through eleven regulations. For asylum seekers, screening at the border will now include an identity check, and their conditions of health and vulnerability must be verified within seven days of arrival. On the other hand, return procedures are accelerated for those whose asylum applications are rejected. Moreover, the Eurodac regulation established in 2000 and revised in 2013 has been reformed in the new pact. Originally, this database, whose acronym stands for “European asylum dactyloscopy” (fingerprints) was limited to the control of the digital recording of fingerprints. It will now include biometrics. Eurodac also allows for the fingerprinting of children, lowering the minimum age from 14 years to six. Not only will the data collected serve in the identification of asylum purposes—in an effort to limit “asylum-shopping”—but the scope of the Eurodac regulation has been expanded to include “new functions relating to assisting in returning irregular migrants; selecting persons for admission and resettlement; protecting children; supporting other systems; and, becoming a primary pool of information for compilation of statistical data to enable evidence-based policy making.”[6]
The new pact also proposes to address the solidarity issue that could never be solved during the 2015 crisis, in particular by focusing on the Dublin Regulation’s principle of first entry. The latter has been retained in the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (AMM) that clarifies and replaces the Dublin Regulation. For example, it clarifies responsibilities in the examination of asylum claims. Under the new regulation, the country of first entry continues to be where the application is filed, but another member state could become responsible for processing the claim when a family member is already present there. If the asylum seeker has graduated from a school located in an EU country within six years prior to the time of his or her asylum application, that EU member state is responsible for the claim (article 20).[7] The principle of first entry is of specific interest to the EU southern member states, which have been disproportionally impacted by arrivals but have struggled with the voluntary relocation mechanism[8] proposed in 2015 by then President of the European Commission Jean-Paul Juncker. Under the previous regulation, this mechanism enabled the relocation of individuals who had arrived mostly in Italy and Greece to other EU countries, as well as to Norway and Switzerland. Through relocation, asylum seekers are “re-distributed” to countries that are not under migratory pressure and have the administrative capacity to process asylum applications. In 2015, 34,700 persons were relocated, mostly to Germany. This number shows the limitation of the voluntary nature of the system, since that year there were roughly 1.4 million first-time applicants seeking international protection in the EU.[9] In 2025, they were 1.2 million applicants across the EU.
In response to this limitation, the new pact establishes a financial mechanism by which EU member states can opt out of welcoming asylum seekers in exchange for a financial contribution into the EU Solidarity Pool (20,000 euros per asylum seeker who is turned away). Every year, EU countries will have to either agree to welcome relocated migrants or pay into the fund. A “High-Level Solidarity Forum” took place in November 2025 during which EU member states could make a pledge about which type of solidarity contributions they would make: accept relocations, contribute financially, or take alternative solidarity measures. The threshold figure for the solidarity pool in 2026 is 21,000 relocations or other solidarity efforts or 420 million euros in financial contributions.[10] One critique made is that this new system is not necessarily equitable and that the fund might not be enough to fully support frontliner countries such as Greece, Italy, Malta, or Cyprus. It also creates an opportunity for EU members to opt-out of their asylum obligations. Indeed, research has highlighted that “southern member states may view responsibility offsets as a way to shift responsibilities further northward, while northern member states could make relocation pledges conditional on completion of Dublin transfers.”[11]
The implementation of the pact has taken place as immigration policies have hardened all over Europe. Ten years after Angela Merkel’s “Wir schaffen das” (we will succeed), even labor governments and parties have shifted their position over immigration. The Danish prime minister (a Social Democrat) was one of the first European governments’ representatives, ahead of the UK’s prime minister, to agree to outsource[12] the reception of asylum seekers to Rwanda. The Danish leader joined Italy to organize the coordination of an initiative by nine other European countries[13]—Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Baltic countries, and Poland—that asked for changes in the way the European Court on Human Rights (ECHR) interprets issues of migration and deportation, notably when it comes to the independence of the judges and the pressures they are under. In their letter,[14] these countries remained quite vague as to what kind of interpretation they would like to see. They stated for instance that
the Court, in some cases, has extended the scope of the Convention too far as compared with the original intentions behind the Convention, thus shifting the balance between the interests which should be protected. We believe that the development in the Court’s interpretation has, in some cases, limited our ability to make political decisions in our own democracies. And thereby affected how we as leaders can protect our democratic societies and our populations against the challenges facing us in the world today
The letter denounced caselaw where “the interpretation of the Convention has resulted in the protection of the wrong people” and pointed to the fact that “It is beyond our comprehension how some people can come to our countries and get a share in our freedom and our vast range of opportunities, and, indeed, decide to commit crimes.” These statements undermined the presumption of innocence and the rights of migrants (irregular or not)—considered to be second-class citizens, as opposed to what the letter’s signatories called “law-abiding citizens.”
Return as a European Objective
In the face of this hardening of EU asylum policy, the European Commission proposed to revise the Return Directive in March 2025. This directive, adopted in 2008, had become inefficient. Indeed, according to Eurostat,[15] one person out of three who has received a return decision has been sent back to his/her country of origin, with a slight increase in those numbers in the last quarter of 2024. The proposed reform includes common procedures across the EU, the mutual recognition of national return decisions, and specific rules for individuals considered to be a security risk. Within this framework, the European Commission has proposed the creation of “return hubs” in third countries, intended to host individuals subject to a final return decision, with the exception of unaccompanied minors and members of families with minors. Another example of the importance of return is the better identification of individuals who have overstayed their Schengen visas. Introduced in October 2025, a new entry/exit system based on biometric data enhances monitoring and border control in Europe. This will enable a better identification of people who initially arrive legally in Europe with a visa but stay irregularly and therefore are less visible than people crossing the Mediterranean sea.
However, return rates have been low, which reflects a complex reality. In third party countries, the public has not looked favorably on their new role as gendarme of the EU. Moreover, some return decisions have remained unenforceable due to moratoria or instability in countries of origin, since returns can only be carried out to countries deemed to be safe. The latter condition has automatically opened a discussion on what constitutes a safe third country and triggered the European Commission to propose the establishment of a common list to be used by the 27 member states to speed up the processing of applications and facilitate returns. Under the Danish presidency, the European Council and European Parliament have agreed to place Kosovo, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, India, Bangladesh, and Colombia on the list of safe countries.[16] These developments raise questions about respect for human rights. The principle of non-refoulement, which derives from the Article 33(1) of the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, stipulates that no contracting state shall expel or return (refouler in French) “a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” Given that all EU member states are signatories to this convention, it has been incorporated into national law. In addition, article 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU specifies the need to comply with that principle. Moreover, civil society organizations[17] have expressed concern over the risk of returning rejected asylum seekers to countries with which they have no connection.
EU Migration Diplomacy: Geopolitics before Human Rights?
Since 2004, the EU has sought to negotiate the return of irregular migrants intercepted on its territory through readmission agreements with origin countries. These agreements exist both at the bilateral level, for example, between France and Algeria or between Spain and Morocco, and at the European level, involving all 27 member states. This approach aims to manage migration flows away from EU territories, by outsourcing migration control to third countries, often in association with financial incentives.
At the EU level, the implementation of the Migration Pact has thus been accompanied by the conclusion of migration agreements with Tunisia (July 2023), Egypt (March 2024), and Mauritania (March 2024), as well as with Lebanon, Libya, Senegal, and Jordan (January 2025). Led by the European Commission in cooperation with member states, these agreements are part of the “Team Europe” initiative, intended to demonstrate the EU’s capacity to manage migration flows effectively. They primarily focus on regulating irregular flows and introducing new financial incentives. In the case of Tunisia, one billion euros has been allocated to support economic reforms, Tunisia’s energy transition, and people-to-people initiatives, among which a plan to provide Tunisia 105 million euros for migration management. However, the authoritarian nature of the Tunisian regime and the lack of involvement of the European Parliament in the making of diplomatic deals, which remain gentlemen’s agreements, raise questions about the respect for migrants’ rights—concerns that were already highlighted in 2023 by the former European Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, in her own-initiative inquiry.[18]
The nature of the deals included in the 2024 New Pact on Migration recalls the 2016 EU-Turkey deal that entailed that for each irregular migrant intercepted in Greece and sent back to Turkey, one Syrian refugee coming from Turkey would be allowed into the EU, based on a “one for one” principle. Ankara has not enforced the agreement since the COVID-19 pandemic though. Moreover, Turkey’s request to lift visa requirements for Turkish citizens migrating to the EU has been unsuccessful, as the EU considers that Turkey does not meet its immigration criteria. Thus, today the EU primarily limits itself to the financing of Turkey’s reception of refugees.
EU migration diplomacy also has a geopolitical dimension: Migration does not always result from humanitarian crises or individual choices; it can be the result of an instrumentalization by states or non‑state actors to obtain economic, security, or political advantages. In 2015, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya warned the EU that Europe would become a “black continent” if his demands for funding in order to control migration outflows were not met. More recently, in the summer of 2021, Aleksandr Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus encouraged migrants from the Middle East and North Africa to cross the borders into Poland and Lithuania. Lukashenko weaponized migrants in response to EU sanctions on his regime, a turn which has been seen as part of a “hybrid warfare” strategy. This strategy has been historically linked to state influence, as explained by Kelly Greenhill in her book on Weapons of Mass Migration (2016).[19]
The war in Ukraine has also influenced negotiations around the pact, particularly regarding the regulation of crisis and force‑majeure situations, since the pact allows for the implementation of solidarity measures in the event of a massive influx of migrants. This geopolitical dimension partly explains why the European Commission has sometimes been perceived as tolerant of certain pushbacks at the borders of the Baltic States, for example in the case of Latvia and Lithuania at the border with Belarus because “these two countries are doing their best to protect the EU border.”[20] In addition, these countries have suspended the right to asylum under specific emergency laws. Many member states have also started to put into question the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, as has Rob Jetten, the leader of the Democrats 66, a liberal party in the Netherlands that won the 2025 legislative election and is currently in discussion to form a government coalition—signaling a real shift in how European governments think about asylum.
Rescue at Sea and Border Surveillance: A Retreat in Humanitarian Obligations
The EU Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex, responsible for border management and coastguard operations since 2004, remains a key actor in the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. It coordinates returns, and its mandate is scheduled to be revised in 2026 to strengthen its role in implementing the new return policy under the Migration Pact. The agency’s staff, based in Warsaw, could triple by 2027, according to the objectives set out by the President of the European Commission. Despite criticism, the extension of Frontex’s mandate has continued. Under the leadership of its former director, Fabrice Leggeri, Frontex was accused of covering up instances of Greek coastguards illegally pushing back migrants in the Aegean Sea between March 2020 and September 2021—actions that were presented as “preventive operations,” according to investigations by Lighthouse Reports.[21] Moreover, the agency’s 2024 report by Jonas Grimheden, Fundamental Rights Officer, highlights numerous concerns, including about collective expulsions and mistreatment of people, particularly at the borders of Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia. These incidents sometimes involved border guards, reported to be accompanied by masked actors of unknown affiliation. The report also mentions that maritime procedures were not compliant with international standards. The European Court of Justice has ruled in one case involving a Syrian refugee—Alaa Hamoudi—that Frontex had committed illegal pushbacks at sea;[22] the case focused on the burden of proof and evidence of the pushbacks.
At the same time, sea rescue operations conducted by NGOs, often wrongly accused of encouraging crossings, have faced increased restrictions from certain European governments. For example, in Italy, the Flussi Decree provides for sanctions that can reach vessel confiscation. These restrictions raise concerns regarding the international obligations of member states to rescue at sea—as set out in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS, 1974) and, especially, in the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR, 1979). In this already tense context, NGOs also operate in an increasingly dangerous environment, as demonstrated by the attack on the SOS Méditerranée vessel Ocean Viking by Libyan coastguards in August 2025.
What Demographic Crisis?
Europe is facing acute demographic aging, which could affect its capacity for innovation, as noted in the 2024 Draghi report entitled “The future of European competitiveness – A competitiveness strategy for Europe.” According to Eurostat, the share of people over 80 years of age increased from 3.85 percent in 2004 to 6.15 percent in 2024, while the share of those under fifteen decreased from 16.2 percent to 14.6 percent over the same period.[23] Birth rates are declining in all EU countries except Belgium. A report by the think-tank Bruegel highlights that Eastern and Southern European countries are particularly vulnerable, as their populations are aging faster than that in other regions of Europe and they experience lower net immigration than Northern and Western European countries.[24]
These demographic trends also exacerbate internal imbalances: Immigrant populations are concentrated in large cities, while many rural areas continue to depopulate. This dimension is rarely discussed because member states retain control over admission volumes, which prevents a thoughtful account of the economic and social role of immigrants in the labor market. The Draghi report specifically recommends that Eastern European countries retain talent and also attract more migrants to address labor shortages, while Northern and Western EU countries should focus on labor market reforms and migrant integration policies. Indeed, this is where the challenge lies: The constant securitization of immigration prevents a depoliticized debate on the transversal integration of migration issues into other public policies. The future of pensions, for example, depends on a reformed labor migration policy that could better harness the entrepreneurial potential of immigrants and refugees.
Despite the controls envisaged under the European Migration Pact, migration remains a reality, driven by the search for employment, the avoidance of conflicts, and the existence of diasporas. According to UNHCR, 123.2 million people were displaced by war or violence in 2024, namely one in every 67 people of the world’s population. Moreover, flows adapt to restrictions: In 2025, crossings of the English Channel surged by 26 percent, with 25,000 passages in August, and new routes are emerging, such as between Libya and Crete. These dynamics, rarely the result of free choice for migrants, serve as a reminder that Europe faces demographic, economic, and geopolitical challenges that call for sustainable and balanced responses.
Sarah Wolff is Professor of International Studies and Global Politics at Leiden University. Her research concentrates on global international relations, gender, migration, and religion in international relations, the European Union, and North Africa. She is on the editorial board of the journal Mediterranean Politics. Her book published by Michigan University Press on Secular Power Europe and Islam: Identity and Foreign Policy received the 2023 best book award from the European Union Studies Association. She works with European governments on migration and rescue at sea.
[1] https://www.iom.int/fundamentals-migration
[2] https://www.unhcr.org/about-unhcr/overview/figures-glance
[3] Cerrone, Joseph. “European Far Right Continued Electoral Advance in 2024, Despite Notable Setbacks.” Illiberalism.org, December 13, 2024. https://www.illiberalism.org/european-far-right-continued-electoral-advance-in-2024-despite-notable-setbacks/
[4] Interior and Administration Ministers of Denmark. Joint Letter to the European Commission on New Solutions to Address Irregular Migration to Europe, June 15, 2024,
[5] “Polish PM Reiterates Opposition to EU Migration Pact.” Polskie Radio English Section, January, 2025. https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/7784/Artykul/3480184,polish-pm-reiterates-opposition-to-eu-migration-pact
[6] Vavoula, Niovi. “The Transformation of Eurodac from an Asylum Tool into an Immigration Database.” EU Migration Law Blog, October 16, 2024, accessed at https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-transformation-of-eurodac-from-an-asylum-tool-into-an-immigration-database/
[7] Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013
[8] Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece
[9] European Migration Network. EMN Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum 2015. European Migration Network, 2016, accessed at https://emnbelgium.be/publication/annual-report-situation-asylum-eu-2015-easo
[10] Council of the European Union. “Migration and Asylum: Member States Agree on Solidarity Pool.” Press release 1049/25, December 8, 2025, accessed at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/12/08/migration-and-asylum-member-states-agree-on-solidarity-pool/pdf/
[11] Trauner, Florian, Philipp Lutz, and Philipp Stutz. Towards a Fairer EU Asylum Policy: Lessons from the Dublin System for the EU’s Solidarity Mechanism. Brussels: European Policy Centre, November 2025, accessed at https://epc.eu/publication/towards-a-fairer-eu-asylum-policy-lessons-from-the-dublin-system-for-the-eus-solidarity-mechanism
[12] Ministry of Immigration and Integration. “Denmark and Rwanda Agree on Joint Declaration.” UIM.dk, September 9, 2022, accessed at https://uim.dk/nyhedsarkiv/2022/september/danmark-og-rwanda-enige-om-faelles-erklaering/
[13] Simone De La Feld (reporter). “Migration, Italy and Denmark joined 27 Countries to Amend the ECHR Convention on Human Rights.” EUnews.it, December 11, 2025., accessed at https://www.eunews.it/en/2025/12/11/migration-italy-and-denmark-joined-27-countries-to-amend-the-echr-convention-on-human-rights/
[14] Meloni, Giorgia, Mette Frederiksen, et al. Lettera aperta (Rome: Government of Italy), May 22, 2025, accessed at https://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/Lettera_aperta_22052025.pdf
[15] Eurostat. “Number of Asylum Applications Declined in March 2025.” Eurostat News, March 31, 2025, accessed at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20250331-1
[16] Council of the European Union. “Asylum Policy: Council and European Parliament Agree on EU List of Safe Countries of Origin.” Press release 1105/25, December 18, 2025, accessed at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/12/18/asylum-policy-council-and-european-parliament-agree-on-eu-list-of-safe-countries-of-origin/
[17] International Rescue Committee (EU Office). “More than 50 NGOs Warn EU’s Safe Country Proposals Risk Weakening Protection for Asylum Seekers.” Rescue.org, December 2025, accessed at https://www.rescue.org/eu/press-release/more-50-ngos-warn-eus-safe-country-proposals-risk-weakening-protection-asylum-seekers
[18] European Ombudsman. Decision 175102, 2025, accessed at https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/export-pdf/en/175102
[19] Greenhill, Kelly M. Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016.
[20] European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE). “EU Eastern Borders: Mixed Developments in Baltic States as EU Defends Lithuania and Latvia Over ‘Legalisation’ of Pushbacks, Polish Government Facing Headwind over Visa Corruption Scheme Amid Protests over Arbitrary Detention, Frontex Expanding Cooperation with Albania.” ECRE, September 15, 2023. https://ecre.org/eu-eastern-borders-mixed-developments-in-baltic-states-as-eu-defends-lithuania-and-latvia-over-legalisation-of-pushbacks-polish-government-facing-headwind-over-visa-corruption-sche/.
[21] https://www.lighthousereports.com/impact/frontex/
[22] Court of Justice of the European Union. Hamoudi v Frontex, C‑136/24 P, 18 December 2025. EUAA Case Law Database, accessed at https://caselaw.euaa.europa.eu/pages/viewcaselaw.aspx?CaseLawID=5518
[23] Eurostat. Demography of Europe – 2025 edition. European Union, 2025 accessed at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/interactive-publications/demography-2025?etrans=fr#ageing-population
[24] Pinkus, David, and Nina Ruer. The Demographic Divide: Inequalities in Ageing Across the European Union. Policy Brief 13/2025. Brussels: Bruegel, March 2025m accessed at https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/demographic-divide-inequalities-ageing-across-european-union
