By Samuel B. H. Faure
In the context of the war in Ukraine, industrial issues are at the core of the European political negotiations that aim at creating institutional conditions conducive to Europe’s strategic autonomy (Haroche 2024). Within the European Union (EU), several initiatives have been undertaken since 2022 to consolidate the internal arms market, support the rearmament of European states through a “war economy” (Cordet 2025), develop a common industrial policy (Fiott 2024), and establish a Europe-wide defense industry (Faure 2025a). These initiatives are known in particular by the acronyms ASAP (Act in Support of Ammunition Production), EDIRPA (European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act), EDIP (European Defence Industry Programme), and SAFE (Security Action for Europe) (Santopinto 2025). The establishment of a Europe-wide defense industry is not a new objective; it corresponds to the well-known acronym “EDTIB” (European Defence Technological Industrial Base), which is frequently used by state and industrial actors as well as experts and journalists.
The first formalized and widely cited appearance of the acronym “EDTIB” within the EU dates back to the publication in 2007 by the European Defence Agency (EDA) of a document entitled A Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (Masson 2004; 2013). But there are examples of its use at a national level prior to 2007, such as in the German White Paper of 2006 and the United Kingdom’s Defence Industrial Strategy of 2005. Already when presenting the 1994 White Paper on defense, the then French Minister of Defense François Léotard referred to the objective of “giving European defense an industrial base.” The acronym, or even the concept or category of analysis “EDTIB” has therefore been used for twenty or even thirty years by stakeholders, both domestically within nations and at the European level, to establish a political orientation to which some have subscribed and others have been opposed. However, the institutionalization of the political uses of the acronym has not led to a shared and stable definition.
How then can we define the European Industrial and Technological Defence Base (EDTIB)? In this article, I propose to define it as “a transnational political-industrial field bringing together state and industrial actors working through European cooperation to develop and produce military or dual-use technologies to arm the state.” This definition distinguishes the EDTIB from both non-European defense industries—particularly the transatlantic one (TDTIB)—and national defense industries (NDTIBs). I will explain this definition below in order to clarify the scope of this transnational political-industrial field (horizontal differentiation), its actors (sectoral differentiation), and its organization (vertical differentiation). To do so, I will specifically comment on the French case. This choice is only in part due to the context in which this text was originally written, namely in preparation for a parliamentary hearing in the French Senate in June 2025 in Paris. Above all, it is important to realize that France is the EU member state with the greatest number of large arms companies in the global top 50 (SIPRI 2024): Thales (16th), Naval Group (32nd), Safran (33rd), Dassault Aviation (46th) and CEA (50th). By way of comparison, this global ranking includes only one Italian company (Leonardo, 13th), one German company (Rheinmetall, 26th), and one Swedish company (Saab, 35th). To this list must be added the three European companies and consortia in which the French state has a stake: Airbus (12th), MBDA (30th), and KNDS (45th).
Scope: In Europe and by Europe (Horizontal Differentiation)
The “E” in the acronym “EDTIB” is the letter that poses a problem, as it is unclear whether the qualifier “European” refers to the continental geographical expanse (Europe) or the political organization (the EU), to initiatives relating to European cooperation or rather to the dynamics of European integration of national policies. To overcome this wide conceptual range, I propose defining the “European” dimension of this political-industrial space as a dual indicator: geographical (in Europe) and political (by Europe). First, the EDTIB represents a transnational political-industrial space located in Europe. However, working “in Europe” does not automatically mean within the EU. In fact, some third countries, i.e., states that are non-EU members but may nonetheless be NATO allies, such as the United Kingdom (UK) or Norway, as well as companies there, can play a catalytic role in promoting the EDTIB. Indeed, the UK has often partaken in European structured cooperation programs to arm itself— such as Typhoon and A400M—whether in the context of the Cold War or afterwards (Faure 2019). In addition, the UK is party to MBDA, the market leader in missile production in Europe and one of few Europe-wide companies (Païtard and Bellais 2024).
This first geographical aspect distinguishes the EDTIB from the Transatlantic Defence Technological and Industrial Base (TDTIB), which includes the US and Canadian state and industrial actors (Caverley et al. 2025). For example, the purchase of F-35 fighter jets, among other transactions, by Germany, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands took place within the framework of the TDTIB, since the prime contractor for F-35s is the US company Lockheed Martin (Bol and Quéau 2024). Moreover, the European dimension of the EDTIB is especially relevant in the context of the war in Ukraine, which has confirmed the challenge of prioritizing strategic autonomy, not only in France (Le Gleut and Conway-Mouret 2019; Faure 2024a) but also in states characterized by a long-standing transatlantic strategic culture, such as Germany (Tenenbaum and Péria-Peigné 2023) or Poland (Zima and Péria-Peigné 2025). However, the geographical criterion alone is not sufficient to define the scope of the EDTIB, as the program conflates political and industrial activities carried out independently by European states at the national level (for instance in the case of Leopard tanks produced by the German company Krauss-Maffei or nuclear power facilities held by the French state) with transnational activities involving European cooperation (for example the production and procurement of Typhoon fighter jets by Germany, Britain, Italy, and Spain).
Second, the EDTIB embodies the transnational political-industrial space that results from decisions taken “by Europe,” an expression that refers to measures carried out through the cooperation of European states and companies, which can be promoted by mechanisms developed and implemented within and by the EU, such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) (Haroche 2020). The advantage of this specific criterion is that it distinguishes the EDTIB from any National Defence Technological and Industrial Base (NDTIB), whether French, German, Polish, Italian, or Swedish. In other words, according to the definition proposed here, the EDTIB does not correspond to the sum of all NDTIBs. In fact, some EU member states—and some of the companies in these states—may work against the strengthening of the EDTIB by favoring their respective NDTIBs or the TDTIB.
Proponents of NDTIBs consider autarkic arms production to be the best way to ensure national sovereignty, despite the ever-increasing cost of development and production. This industrial preference has led certain prime contractors, such as Rheinmetall in Germany and Dassault Aviation in France, to support sovereigntist strategies that constrain rather than drive European cooperation (Faure 2020a). On the other hand, proponents of the TDTIB see the off-the-shelf purchase of F-35s, for example, as the most cost-effective option, as this strategy avoids them the expense of developing military technology while securing them the military support of the US. However, the US nuclear umbrella hoped for by many European allies, especially in the context of the war in Ukraine, has never seemed as fragile and uncertain as it has since President Trump returned to the White House in January 2025. During the latest NATO summit organized in The Hague in June 2025, NATO member states committed to spending 3.5 percent of their GDP on their national military budgets by 2035, and European member states agreed to purchase $100 billion worth of US military equipment for the Ukrainian armed forces (Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List Initiative, or PURL).
Actors: Beyond the National Divide (Sectoral Differentiation)
My fifteen years of research on the subject of military cooperation have enabled me to identify the actors in this sector and how they relate to each other in ways that transcend divisions among nations (Faure 2020b). However, the risk in exploring these relationships—referred to in social sciences as “methodological nationalism”—is to focus solely on the oppositions or collaborations among national units (France, Germany, Poland, Spain, etc.). Indeed, such a simplification of the political and industrial reality overestimates the convergence of interests among political and industrial actors emanating from the same national political contexts and underestimates the circulation of ideas, positions, and resources among states. In France, as in Germany and Poland, certain state and industrial actors support initiatives and programs in favor of the EDTIB (they are known as the “architects of Europe”), while others primarily support the NDTIB (those are known as the “promoters of sovereignty”) and, more rarely, the TDTIB (those are called the “brokers of the hegemon”).
In France, over the long term, the state’s position within and vis-à-vis the EDTIB has developed three characteristics:
1. The French state has played a central role in the emergence and institutionalization of the EDTIB due to its participation in almost all major capability and industrial initiatives. For example, it was a major actor in the Jaguar (France, UK), NH90 (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands), Tiger (France, Germany, Spain), and A400M (France, UK, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Turkey) programs. And today, it participates in the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), and Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) programs. However, some programs that form part of the EDTIB have been carried out without France. This was the case in the 1980s and 1990s with the Eurofighter Typhoon program and, more recently, the Taurus missile program, the latter stemming from a collaboration between Germany and Sweden.
2. Additionally, the French state has held a conflicting position on the EDTIB, including under the presidency of Emmanuel Macron (Faure 2020b). These so-called strategic ambiguities have several sources, starting with France’s status as a nuclear power. While the 2017 presidential candidate Macron may have suggested his support for a more integrated European defense policy, his eight years at the head of the French state so far have confirmed the legacy of his predecessors in the context of the Fifth Republic, which has favored a traditional intergovernmental approach. French strategic culture towards the EU has changed little since 2017.
3. Certain French decision-makers have, at times, taken a position of opposition to the EDTIB. France’s choice, for example, in favor of the Rafale program in the 1980s was interpreted by some—the “promoters of sovereignty”—not only as a national preference but as an opposition to Europe (Faure 2020b). It is interesting to note the striking similarities between Marcel Dassault’s communication in the 1970s/1980s and Dassault current CEO Éric Trappier’s (2025) comments in the 2020s: Dassault Aviation’s industrial legitimacy should not be questioned, and European cooperation can only exist if the French company gets the leadership. In France, the “promoters of sovereignty” still consider the EU to be a foreign affair. Moreover, they have difficulties expressing themselves in English, show ignorance about or even disinterest in other European countries, and exhibit a limited understanding of EU governance.
What is true about these French actors is also true about similar actors in other European states. Indeed, the practice of presenting oneself as legitimate in dominating European partners is not specific to the French company but corresponds to an industrial practice shared by other companies that benefit from proven expertise, hold a monopoly position at the national level in a specific technological segment (combat aircraft, for example), and are owned via a family structure. For instance, there are many similarities between the strategy of Dassault Aviation and that of the German family-owned company Rheinmetall. In short, certain state and industrial actors based in Europe operate to slow down or even oppose the strengthening of the EDTIB.
Organization: A Space Not Only Industrial but Also Political (Vertical Differentiation)
The professional activities taking place in arms production are mainly carried out by private companies, following a process of liberalization that has affected all national armament policies in Europe, including the most dirigiste policies, such as those developed and implemented by the French state (Hoeffler 2013). This transformation of defense capitalism in Europe would seem to favor qualifying the sector as strictly industrial, as is indeed suggested by the “I” in the acronym EDTIB, which noticeably does not include a “P” for “political.” Nevertheless, I choose to qualify this space as “politico-industrial” in order to emphasize the continuing dual role of state actors in the governance of the defense industry in Europe.
On the supply side, the state continues to shape the political and institutional organization of this politico-industrial sphere, even if governance mechanisms vary from one national context to another (Faure and Smith 2019). States with a dirigiste political economy participate in the shareholding and governance of certain companies. For example, that is the case in France with Nexter and Naval Group. On the other hand, states that govern their defense industry through liberal public policies, such as the UK, tend to shape the industrial activity of companies by encouraging competition among them (DeVore and Weiss 2014). On the demand side, individual states remain the sole purchasers of military equipment, retaining a monopoly on the legitimate acquisition and use of arms, to paraphrase Max Weber. No non-state actor has the right to purchase fighter jets, warships, or missiles. On the other hand, a number of regulatory, institutional, and financial mechanisms have enabled the EU to play a political role in the development and production of military or dual-use technologies, from the vote in the EU Parliament in favor of a defense package in 2009 to the Omnibus package of 2025, aimed at simplifying European defense regulations (Faure, Jubelin, and Lamigeon 2025).
In short, defining the EDTIB as a political-industrial space allows us to emphasize two elements that are both distinctive and structuring: The EDTIB implicates markets both smaller and more heavily regulated than those in other industrial sectors, which are determined primarily or exclusively by commercial considerations, such as markets in the automotive, retail, and telecommunications sectors (Bellais et al. 2014).
The Current Situation: The EDTIB, a Heteronomous Field
According to the definition proposed here, the political-industrial space known as the EDTIB certainly does exist. However, it remains fragile due to its heteronomy, i.e., its dual political-industrial dependence on what occurs in European states at the national level and on the transatlantic relationship with the US. As a result, there are still only two European champions in the defense market, Airbus and MBDA, to which must be added companies that are weakly integrated but on the path to integration, such as KNDS. National companies such as Dassault Aviation, Leonardo, Thales, or Saab can cooperate and thereby contribute to strengthening the EDTIB, but this is by no means automatic. In terms of armament programs, European states devote less than 20 percent of their military budgets to armaments produced through European cooperation—a stable proportion that has not increased since the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022, in spite of the 30 percent target that had already been set in 2014 by the EDA, and therefore by the defense ministers of EU member states, after the annexation of Crimea by Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
Regarding the EU, the two institutional actors showing the most obvious efforts at strengthening the EDTIB are the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) within the European Commission (the Directorate-General for Competition has a less interventionist and more market-driven view of what the EDTIB should be) and the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE). To a certain extent, these two actors are joined by the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) within the European Parliament. Within the European Council and the Council of the EU, I would place less emphasis on whether states are “for” or “against” the EDTIB—as we usually do—than on whether national governments support public measures favorable to the EDTIB. For example, we see variations in levels of support between the current Polish government led by the liberal Donald Tusk (showing strong support for the EU and the European strategic autonomy agenda) and the previous government led by the neo-conservatives of the PiS strongly opposed to the EU. It is also a question of moving beyond the idea that national ministries of defense are monoliths in which all agents are aligned. In France, for example, the Armed Forces Staff (EMA) may formulate positions that are more favorable to European cooperation than is the arms procurement agency (the Direction générale de l’armement, or DGA).
Due to its heteronomy, the EDTIB—generally described as fragmented—remains a weak political-industrial field, i.e., an area of industrial production and political activity heavily dependent on national actors in Europe (states and companies) and on the US. As a result of its heteronomous structure, the EDTIB is mainly invested in by national (French, Polish, German, Italian, etc.) and US actors, only a minority of whom have developed a strategy in support of a strong EDTIB and of the European strategic autonomy agenda, which does not represent the simple sum of all national interests (Faure 2024b). Strengthening the EDTIB requires dual industrial and political autonomy: autonomy from transatlantic stakeholders and autonomy from national stakeholders. This requirement entails accepting to challenge powerful deep-seated and well-established political and industrial interests in the US and individual European nations. This is a task the “architects of Europe” will have to amplify as they continue to confront the “promoters of sovereignty” and the “brokers of the hegemon.” The same approach is needed to increase and accelerate Europe’s autonomous military capabilities to face Russia, which is perceived as the main threat to Europe’s collective security in the short and medium term (Faure 2024c; Tenenbaum, Guyot, and Furgolle 2025). The future of the continent depends on this effort.
Samuel B. H. Faure is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM) in Paris, teaches at UCLouvain Saint-Louis Bruxelles, and co-edits the academic journal Politique européenne. He has published over sixty academic articles and books on European defense policy and European Union politics, including The Elgar Companion to the European Union, co-edited with Christian Lequesne (Edward Elgar, 2023). More information here.
Note: An initial version of this text was drafted in preparation for a hearing held at the Senate in Paris on 24 June 2025 at the invitation of Senator Hélène Conway-Mouret, who, together with Senator Pascal Allizard, is responsible for drafting an information report on the EDTIB, due to be published in 2026. Report No. 184 on the European Defence Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) was registered with the Presidency of the Senate on 3 December 2025: https://www.senat.fr/rap/r25-184/r25-184.html
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