By Sahin Göksu
This article examines Turkey’s foreign policy toward Turkish-speaking minorities in Southeast Europe through a theory-driven analytical framework combining realism, neoclassical realism, and the kin-state approach. It argues that Ankara’s minority policy follows a predominantly defensive and stabilizing logic, aimed at preserving influence, minimizing escalation, and maintaining regional maneuverability. Drawing on a longitudinal analysis from 1983 to 2024, the study identifies key determinants shaping policy variation across countries, including the status of minorities, bilateral relations, power asymmetries, and broader international structures. Turkey’s engagement relies heavily on soft-power instruments—such as cultural diplomacy, educational programs, and development aid. The findings highlight that Ankara calibrates its approach contextually: cooperative environments favor low-profile cultural engagement, whereas rising tensions trigger more visible political signaling. Despite occasional assertiveness, Turkey avoids overt confrontation, prioritizing strategic restraint in a region shaped by competing external actors such as the EU, NATO, and Russia. Overall, the article demonstrates that Turkey’s minority policy is not expansionist but interest-driven, blending identity-based motivations with pragmatic security considerations. This dual strategy enables Ankara to sustain influence while limiting risks, offering broader insights into how states manage diaspora and co-ethnic relations in complex geopolitical settings.
Anyone strolling through the alleys of Plovdiv (Bulgaria), the bazaars of Skopje (Republic of Macedonia), or the old town of Prizren (Kosovo) today will encounter a network of historical and cultural layers that have been superimposed over centuries. Ottoman bridges, minarets, and loan words from Turkish testify to how closely the Balkans and Anatolia have been intertwined for centuries. These visible traces of the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) in the region are more than just memories: they represent a multi-centennial presence, dating back to the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans in the fourteenth century, which continues to influence identities, expectations, and Turkey’s foreign policy calculations towards Balkan countries, in particular those with a significant Muslim population. In this geopolitically tense area, Turkey continues to have a special relationship with well-established minority communities of ethnic Turks located in Bulgaria, Greece (Western Thrace), North Macedonia, Romania, and Kosovo. These groups, which include approximately 500,000 Turks in Bulgaria and 130,000 in Greece, are historically rooted kin communities whose presence long predates the modern Turkish Republic. Consequently, Turkey has, since its founding (1923) after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, pursued an “external minority policy” to support the Turkish minorities of Southeast Europe. Today, this policy tends to be defensive and strategically oriented, although its tone, intensity, and instruments vary depending on the context and the country where these Turkish minorities have long been established.
A state’s external minority policy includes all its diplomatic, cultural, political, or economic activities that target nationals located abroad who constitute an ethnocultural minority group wherever they are located outside the origin country—here, Turkish people living in the Balkan countries. In political science, this concept is most prominently discussed in the literature on the kin‑state (Brubaker 1996; Preissler 2014), which highlights that such policy rarely follows purely normative motives but is embedded in security interests, concerns over the reputation of the origin state, and domestic political incentives. This article draws on this kin-state approach but also on classical realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism, as well as on institutional instruments and epochal profiles of Turkish foreign policy to situate Turkey’s contemporary external minority policy within the country’s long‑term strategic and historical evolution.
Since the 2000s, Turkey has consolidated a professionalized institutional landscape for its cultural and minority policy concerning Turkish minorities abroad. For example, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), founded in 1992, has implemented development projects, the restoration of cultural sites, and micro‑initiatives with direct local impact in countries hosting Turkish minorities. In addition, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), established in 2010, has managed scholarship schemes, diaspora programs, and alumni networks, developing long-term social capital among Turkish minorities abroad. Finally, the Yunus Emre Institute (YEE), created in 2007, has anchored Turkey’s cultural presence in Southeast Europe through language courses, cultural diplomacy, and partnerships with local educational actors in destination countries. Together, these institutions form a division‑of‑labor system that enables soft‑power engagement with Turkish minorities across the region.
Since the nineteenth century, minority issues have been among the most sensitive topics in European politics. Where languages, religions, and historical loyalties overlap, cultural diversity is accompanied by lines of conflict. The Balkans serve as a paradigmatic space for this tension since state orders, borders, and affiliations have been renegotiated in rapid succession there. These processes have left lasting traces in the countries of the region—in the public’s perception, institutions, and state foreign policy. Historical experiences, cultural continuities, and family connections—promoted by waves of outmigration in the twentieth century—have created a resonance chamber by which events occurring in the Balkans receive special attention in Turkish public and political life. Since the founding of the Republic of Türkiye (1923), Ankara’s policy towards Turkish minorities in Southeast Europe has experienced varying degrees of visibility. It has served as a policy of contact, a signal to partners and rivals that Turkey remains attentive to minority‑related developments outside of its own borders, and an instrument of regional stabilization.
Turkey’s efforts at developing a policy aimed at Turkish minorities in Southeast Europe lead to an interrogation as to whether Turkey has used this policy to in fact serve its own political interests. These efforts also foster a necessary exploration of the tone, depth, and instruments favored in this policy-making. It is argued here that Turkey has followed a predominantly defensive, stabilizing logic to minimize diplomatic escalation with host states and preserve maneuvering room in managing issues related to Turkish minorities abroad. While Turkey pursues its power-political interests, it does so through a defensive-stabilizing lens that seeks to avoid the high costs of regional conflict (Waltz 1979; Lobell et al. 2009). This approach does not rule out situationally pointed reactions or diplomatic pressure when the rights of a minority are at stake. However, such measures are not a shift toward raw confrontation; rather, they are anchored in a careful calculation to maintain control over any potential escalation (Baumann et al. 1999). Thus, while Turkey’s policies express a professionalization and intensification of regional minority issues, they are designed to signal Turkey’s attentiveness without triggering a military or diplomatic collapse with its neighbors (Brubaker 1996; Preissler 2014). The threat of an escalation of tensions in the region rests in Turkey’s overall shift from external minority policies based on soft power to more confrontational measures that signal its desire to increase diplomatic pressure on states hosting Turkish minorities. While Turkey’s policies do not imply potential military action, they do express a politicization and intensification of regional minority issues, which may cause reputational damage to host states or exacerbate bilateral tensions between Turkey and these states.
Historical Interconnections and Demographic Foundations
The Ottoman expansion, which started in the fourteenth century, created a dense network of migrations, a slew of religious conversions, and new institutional arrangements. Today, cities such as Skopje, Prizren, Thessaloniki, and Plovdiv continue to serve as repositories of political significance for Turkey’s historical memory and foreign policy sensitivities. With the end of the Ottoman Empire in the twentieth century, Turkish communities outside Turkey per se entered into new contexts of loyalty toward the different now nation-states in which they had lived. In these countries, they experienced phases of harsh assimilation, resettlement, and flight, but also periods of legal recognition and integration. The demographic footprint of this history is still evident today in the number of Balkan Turks concentrated in Bulgaria (500,000), Greece/Western Thrace (approximately 130,000), North Macedonia (75,000), Romania (50,000), and Kosovo (20,000), among other places.
For Ankara, these groups serve as historically grounded reference points for interpreting developments in the Balkans. Migration to and from the region has created geographically extensive familial and social ties to Turkey, which has produced a dual resonance: on the one hand, these historical population movements are part of a collective memory, and on the other, there are many individual cross-border biographical bonds within families. Together, these factors heighten the sensitivity of Turkish political actors toward Turkish minority groups established throughout the Balkans. This sensitivity shapes how Turkish decision-makers formulate their overall Balkan policy agenda, especially on the issue of ethnic Turks in the region.
Theoretical Framework: Power, Identity, and Kin‑State Logic
The pattern in Turkey’s foreign policy engagement toward Turkish minorities in the Balkans can be interpreted through the Classical Realism lens (Morgenthau 1946), by which can be emphasized Turkey’s gain of power and influence over any host country, and Neorealism (Waltz 1979), by which Turkey’s drive can be translated into a logic that maximizes security and prosperity under structural constraints. Turkey’s policy concerning Turkish minorities in Southeastern European countries thus appears as a lever for stabilizing a sensitive regional environment, limiting foreign influence, and building a basis to negotiate credit with host governments and external actors—credit that can be used to secure cooperation, prevent unfavorable policy shifts in the host countries, or strengthen Turkey’s diplomatic position. Moreover, Turkey’s modus operandi has been predominantly defensive, aiming at protecting its existing political, cultural, and diplomatic positions in the region rather than pursuing any form of territorial or military expansion.
Constructivist insights complement the classical realist and neorealist view of foreign policy. Identities, narratives, and historical semantics related to Turkey’s ties to Turkish minorities outside of Turkey also act as sources of legitimacy for Turkish decision‑makers within Turkey because it is perceived that Turkey attends to the needs of family relatives in the diaspora. Neoclassical realism focuses on systemic constraints at the same time as it accounts for domestic limitations. It also emphasizes that civil society coalitions, the elites, and the state all determine how external incentives translate into concrete policy (Lobell et al. 2009). Thus, the neoclassical realist perspective can explain why identical political structural conditions (e.g., EU/NATO dynamics) can lead to different outcomes in the same way that the Turkish domestic political situation influences Ankara’s policy toward Turks abroad.
Ankara’s Policy toward Turkish Minorities Abroad: Design and Operationalization
This study is a theory-driven, qualitative, and comparative case study. A longitudinal analysis covers the period from 1983 to 2024, dividing it into four sub-periods (1983–1991, 1992–2002, 2003–2013, and 2014–2024). The data is based on official statements by members of the Turkish government and on press releases from ministries, as well as parliamentary documents, media reports from national newspapers, and interviews with experts. Fieldwork observations are also used. These sources allow for a valid analysis of the various positions and instruments in Ankara’s policies toward Turkish minorities established outside Turkey. Nevertheless, there are limitations, since official communication is selective. Media reports are often event-centered, and interviews are subject to subjective distortions. However, these weaknesses are mitigated by triangulation and historical comparisons. Quantifying the impact of cultural policy instruments abroad is methodologically challenging. Network effects, trust-building, and symbolic resonance in the Turkish diaspora—for example through the political meaning attached to state visits by Turks in the Balkan countries, the restoration of monuments with cultural value located abroad, or cultural programs aimed at Turks abroad—are difficult to measure beyond hard output indicators, i.e., quantifiable results such as the number of scholarships granted to Turks abroad or of restored mosques in the Balkan countries.
The foreign policy analysis grid operationalized by the Tübingen School—which combines systemic constraints and domestic policy variables—is further used, and realistic assumptions are linked to the kin-state approach. This framework allows for an analysis of Turkey’s state‑led engagement with Turkish minorities in the region as the result of Turkey’s external strategic considerations and internal political dynamics. Realistic assumptions explain Turkey’s pursuit of increased regional influence, while the kin-state approach conceptualizes Ankara’s involvement with co-ethnic communities—Turkish minority groups with shared linguistic and cultural heritage located outside Turkey—as a foreign policy tool. In this sense, Turkey’s policies toward Turkish minorities in the Balkans are interpreted not merely as constituting cultural outreach but as instruments embedded in broader foreign policy objectives. On this basis, a basic model is developed that identifies the factors determining Ankara’s policy toward external minorities and speculates on its impact. The model serves both as a structural description and as a test of hypotheses. It draws on preliminary work on Ankara’s external minority policy and combines the results in a practical framework. At its core is the assumption that any external minority policy—regardless of its normative appearance—aims to maintain or gradually increase the power potential of the origin country. This goal does not necessarily mean offensive expansion. In the case of Turkey, the aim is not necessarily to increase its influence, but rather to maintain the status quo, i.e., the existing balance of power in the region, which often manifests itself through the securing of existing positions and scope for action.
Concretely, the model distinguishes between trigger and moderating factors, as well as mechanisms. Factors that might trigger a country to develop an external minority policy include the deterioration of a particular minority’s situation wherever it is located in the world, exogenous shocks (such as regional crises), or changes in any existing bilateral agreement between the home country and another where the minority in question is located. Moderating factors in the making of such policy include power asymmetries between the home and host countries, how vulnerable the diasporic minority is, and alliances between the origin country and countries where the minority is present. Finally, the mechanisms by which the home country effects external minority policy include:
(a) symbolic politics (rhetoric, visits by origin countries’ state officials, and formal resolutions),
(b) foreign cultural policy levers (cultural programs organized for Turks abroad, student scholarships for members of the Turkish diaspora, and the restoration of Turkish cultural artifacts located abroad),
(c) diplomatic negotiations, especially via quiet diplomacy, which includes informal consultations between origin and settlement countries and other arrangements, and, in rare cases,
(d) migration or consular instruments.
The specific configuration of these mechanisms shapes the kind of policy that results. If the cost of escalating tensions in a particular region where Turks are located is high, it is more likely that Turkey will opt for a policy that favors cultural and educational programs. If the risk of escalation is low, Turkey is more likely to send public signals about its discontent over the way Turkish minorities are treated in these countries of residence, while at the same time attempting to control escalation and bilateral tensions.
Instruments of Turkish External Minority Policy
Ankara’s policy toward Turkish minorities abroad has been focused on cultural, educational, and development programs, which act as soft power instruments that are perceived as a way to protect these minorities and a signal to host states that Turkey is not indifferent to matters concerning these minorities and that it sees itself as a protecting power for them. Since the 2000s, Turkey has developed a set of such programs. For example, TİKA implements visible infrastructure and heritage restoration projects, often with immediate everyday benefits in communities abroad where Turkish minorities live. The organization YTB awards scholarships to Turkish youth in the diaspora, builds alumni networks, and promotes life successes through education—an investment in long-term connections between Turks at home and Turks residing abroad. The Yunus Emre Institutes (YEE) anchor Turkey’s cultural presence through language courses, cultural programs, and cooperation with local institutions in the host countries. This organizational landscape follows a soft power logic by lowering barriers to cooperation, creating spaces of trust, and generating intermediary networks (teachers, alumni, or association leaders) that serve as informal mediation capital in negotiation or crisis situations. An example of how soft power assets can translate into foreign policy leverage is the role that scholarship alumni and cultural associations had in North Macedonia during debates on minority language rights in the mid‑2010s. Alumni networks facilitated back‑channel communication, allowing Ankara to articulate concerns informally and helping local partners to moderate the public tone of the debate. This approach prevented the issue from escalating into a bilateral diplomatic confrontation. At the same time, soft power has “teeth.” When it comes to interventions in religious practice, language rights, or the status of cultural and historical sites, rapid, visible reactions are possible through, for example, the organization of official delegation trips or the delivery of public statements. Before the 2000s, however, this soft power approach was not favored, as diplomatic and formal immigration agreements dominated Turkey’s policy concerning Turks abroad.
Empirical Analysis: Host Country Profiles
Empirically, Ankara’s engagement with Turkish minorities outside of Turkey differs across host countries in terms of intensity, policy instruments used, and the degree of political assertiveness demonstrated. Four primary variables are determined:
(1) the situation of the Turkish minority in the host country (legal status, degree of integration, and level of repression by local authorities),
(2) the quality of bilateral relations between Turkey and the host country (climate of cooperation, parallel conflicts, and bilateral policy agenda),
(3) power and vulnerability profile of the Turkish minority in the host country (economic interdependence, political leverage, and cost to reputation, i.e., the potential damage to its diplomatic or public‑image Turkey may incur if it does not react to minority‑related developments), and
(4) international structural arrangements (regional crises, alliance and sanction architectures, and presence of third parties).
These variables explain why similar events—such as when a religious or cultural building is assigned a new function—lead to reactions of varying intensity by Ankara and their interplay shapes the tone and depth of Ankara’s politics toward Turkish minorities abroad. When repression against ethnic Turks increases in a host country, Ankara is under more pressure to act; where cooperation prevails, the use of cultural and educational instruments dominates and the intensity of conflict is low.
In the Balkans, Bulgaria exemplifies a historically shaped trajectory in which early oppression of Turkish minorities there led to long-lasting sensitivities. Greece represents the most structurally constrained environment, as minority issues there are embedded in highly explosive security dilemmas. In North Macedonia, an asymmetrically favorable environment enables Ankara to convert its soft power capital into political power. And in Kosovo, a commitment to minorities merges with broader symbolic and development-oriented state-building initiatives. These cases form a continuum: at one end stands Bulgaria where relations between the state and Turkish minorities have been shaped primarily by historical trauma and a politics of remembrance rooted in repeated assimilation campaigns, including but not limited to those of the 1980s; and at the other end stands Greece, where relations have been driven by alliance commitments and geopolitical restraint. Between these two poles Ankara is proactive but remains bounded by structural considerations. This continuum also clarifies why policy portfolios vary in depth and visibility. When dealing with strong and institutionalized host states (Greece and Bulgaria), Ankara emphasizes de‑escalatory signaling and cultural continuity. When dealing with host states that exhibit greater openness or asymmetry (North Macedonia and Kosovo), Ankara’s projects become denser, and its cultural presence and diplomatic activism increase. The variation is therefore not random but rather analytically predictable. The stronger the structural constraints, the quieter and more symbolic the repertoire of Ankara’s action. The lower the risks and the stronger the leverage, the more confidently soft power tools can be elevated to political resources.
Domestic political configurations also structure the pace and focus of Turkey’s policy towards Turkish minorities abroad. Phases of stability in the Turkish government favor continuous foreign cultural and education policy, reliable project strands, and network maintenance. When domestic politics is polarized or there is economic tension in Turkey, the balance shifts: symbolic politics gains in importance, and foreign policy steps are avoided because riskier. Overall, the professionalization of foreign cultural policy instruments since the 2000s has increased the resilience of such policy in the face of domestic political fluctuations.
However, Turkey does not operate in a vacuum. The Balkans are also a field of action for the EU, NATO, Russia, China, and various Gulf states. Against this backdrop, historical reference frameworks, linguistic and cultural connectivity, and a set of operationally savvy tools offer Turkey some comparative advantages. At the same time, European and transatlantic structures limit Turkey’s scope of engagement in offensive maneuvers in the region. Concrete points of friction illustrate these structural limits. Tensions arise between Turkey and the EU when Turkish cultural activities are interpreted as political influence operations—for example in the case of mosque restorations or funding to certain associations in Bulgaria and Greece. Moreover, the minority issue in Western Thrace intersects with Aegean security dilemmas in NATO, obliging Turkey to avoid actions that might escalate alliance disputes with Greece. Russia constitutes a further yet different kind of constraint. Indeed, in moments of heightened regional tension, Ankara avoids sending signals that could be interpreted as encroaching on Russian influence in the Orthodox‑Slavic sphere, particularly in Bulgaria and North Macedonia. When it comes to China, its growing presence in the region through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) requires careful calibration, as Ankara seeks economic benefits from the BRI but does not want to appear to be securitizing minority issues. For Gulf states, competition in the region emerges in religious and educational fields—over who funds local Islamic institutions—which occasionally narrows the space available for Turkish initiatives. As a result, Turkey must balance its approach between maintaining a strong enough presence to sustain a profile of independence and exercising enough restraint to avoid systemic friction. Comparatively, it is striking that in phases of regional détente, the returns on quiet, long-term instruments (scholarships, cultural projects, or city-to-city partnerships) increase. In phases of increased uncertainty, Turkey’s visibility also increases—but primarily with a de-escalating counter-character. Even where the “minority card” is played, its purpose usually remains defensive, in that it minimizes risks and secures room for Ankara to maneuver and maintain a stable reputation.
Strategic Restraint as the Method of Choice
Turkey’s policy towards Turkish minorities abroad has followed a defensive, stabilizing basic logic. The aim has been to avoid the withdrawal of minorities from social spaces in countries where Turks have historically been present and limit external influences that could curtail Turkish minorities’ freedom of action there. Turkey’s policy serves as a low-threshold signal and contact policy which, depending on the situation, can transition into more robust instruments without jeopardizing the fundamental balance of power in the region.
Turkey’s policy towards the Turkish diaspora navigates between normative demands (citizens’ protection, participation in public life, and cultural rights) and the logic of state interests. For the communities concerned, it can seem ambivalent that support from Ankara is available but nonetheless conditional. In times of increased danger—such as heightened repression, discriminatory measures, or acute political tensions in the residence country—Ankara’s support increases; in quiet times, support entails more routine cultural and educational programs. From a governance perspective, this approach is balanced. Stable legal conditions require low-profile permanent instruments, while threatening situations justify the deployment of support measures that are visible. Sovereignty issues in the host countries remain sensitive. A successful external minority policy requires coordination between cultural engagement and diplomatic decorum, between visibility and non-provocation. Graduated practices—through the making of cautious statements, the maintaining of contact with local authorities, or cooperation on projects—have proven to be low-friction and effective.
Several key insights can be derived from the analysis above to outline the overall pattern of Turkey’s policy towards Turks abroad. First, the policy is context-dependent rather than a blueprint. Indeed, Ankara’s policy varies according to host countries and temporality. The tone and depth of the policy adapts to specific situations rather that following ideal patterns. Second, Turkey’s policy toward Turkish minorities abroad has followed a basic defensive orientation in which stabilization and risk minimization dominate and offensive maneuvers are rare and limited in their effectiveness. Third, Ankara has favored the use of soft power with strategic embedding through cultural, educational, and development instruments that have long-term effects and form a silent power capital that can be activated in times of crisis. Fourth, power asymmetries have been the driving force of Turkey’s external minority policy. Where vulnerabilities exist, Ankara’s language becomes more explicit, but when countermeasures emerge, calibration is applied again. Finally, Ankara has considered security issues and identity‑based narratives to operate and shape its choices.
Realistic security logic and identity-related motivations have been intertwined in Ankara’s policy, and this interconnection explains the simultaneous persistence of both pragmatism and symbolism in the instruments chosen. In countries where Turkish minorities reside, the more robust the legal protection of minority rights and the more inclusive the institutions, the lower the external escalation response from Turkey. In such constellations, the minority issue becomes a cooperative policy area—supported by educational, cultural, and local partnerships. The benefits of this approach lie in building trust, strengthening the resilience of local structures, and cooling down a potentially symbolically charged agenda. Therefore, it is beneficial for Turkey to use a calibrated dual strategy that combines its permanent soft power presence, with the goal of yielding a low conflict profile and a situational protective action in the event of threats. This approach preserves room for maneuver, minimizes costs, and stabilizes the regional environment without forcing confrontations among blocs.
Analyzing network structures, such as alumni or cultural associations and religious communities, and the comparative impact of TİKA and YEE project clusters is worthwhile. Discourse research is also appropriate to highlight how narratives about history, belonging, and partnership have been produced and used politically. Such approach also allows for the mechanisms of soft power networking to be examined more precisely and tested on the basis of hypotheses. Three limitations should however be emphasized. First, demographic data on Turkish minorities in individual countries of residence are vague, making comparisons difficult. Second, the changing roles of external actors (EU, NATO, Russia, China, and the Gulf states) make incentive structures dependent on particular situations. Third, the Turkish minorities themselves are heterogeneous, as they are comprised of different generations, rural or urban dwellers, and people with various educational levels, suggesting that Ankara’s policy may have differentiated effects. Finally, mixed methods including standardized surveys and social network analyses among Turkish elites (e.g., YTB alumni networks) are recommended. They would allow the mechanisms developed here to be tested more precisely and hence increase their generalizability.
Turkey’s external policy toward Turkish minorities located across Southeast Europe constitutes neither nostalgic folklore nor mere instrumental façade. It integrates historical interrelationships, identity-based political resources, and power-based political calculations into a defensive, context-sensitive policy course. Turkey’s goal is for its policy to be visible but controlled, normatively argued but interest-driven, and cooperation-oriented but conflict-conscious. The benefits for Turkish minorities outside Turkey are real but remain functionally embedded in a logic that seeks to maintain Turkey’s stability and influence in the region. The study confirms that Turkey has used its external minority policy to reinforce its security and economic interests and secure its regional capacity to act without crossing the threshold into offensive destabilization. In countries where the rule of law and minority inclusion are strong, this policy has had its most constructive effects; where they are fragile, the policy becomes an early warning and protection tool—with a focus on escalation control and close networking between culture, diplomacy, and development. As this study highlights the value of a defensive orientation and sustained soft‑power engagement in the construction of a policy relating to historically based cultural minorities in the Balkans, it may also inform how other states manage relations with their diaspora communities.
Sahin Göksu is a political scientist specializing in Turkish foreign policy, energy and environmental policy, and minority policy. His 2025 dissertation from Andrássy University Budapest is entitled Die Politik der Türkei gegenüber den turksprachigen Minderheiten Südosteuropas [Turkey’s policy toward the Turkic-speaking minorities of Southeast Europe] (https://doi.org/10.15772/ANDRASSY.2025.007).
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Photo: Public domain. Ethnographische Karte des Osmanischen Reichs europäischen Theils und von Griechenland (Ethnographic map of the Ottoman Empire, European part and Greece), 1847. Source: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek — Hbks/E 34 o-3#Kt.77.
